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Abstract
In the current study, 126 undergraduate students read a case summary describing an
armed robbery of a convenience store, involving one eyewitness, and then viewed one of
five brief videotapes of an eyewitness identification procedure. Confidence ratings were
manipulated as 80% v. 100%: Type of explanation offered for changes in confidence
consisted of social, memory-based or none. Results indicated increased perceptions of
eyewitnesses were associated with confidence consistency, rather than type of
explanation. Perhaps providing any explanation for changes in confidence drew attention
to the inconsistency and magnified its effect on perceptions. Further, when the eyewitness
provided one estimate of confidence, participants perceived them as more credible
compared to confidence inflation condition. Implications for these results at trial are
discussed.
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I Can Explain!
Understanding Perceptions of Eyewitnesses as a Function of
Type of Explanation and Inconsistent Confidence Statements
Eyewitness misidentifications have been recorded as the leading cause of
wrongful convictions (www.innocenceproject.org.). In more than 75% of the wrongful
convictions exonerated by DNA evidence, mistaken eyewitness identifications played a
major role. This finding provides powerful support of the connection between mistaken
identification and erroneous convictions. Researchers, however, estimate that the number
of innocent defendants convicted through faulty eyewitness evidence is much higher than
the number of exonerations, with as many as 4,500 wrongful convictions per year (Cutler
& Penrod, 1995). Despite the results of research demonstrating problems with lineups
and efforts to remedy the situation, currently utilized methods of eyewitness
identification continue to be linked to wrongful convictions, through mistaken
identification.
Law enforcement officials, who investigate crimes and collect eyewitness
evidence, play a key role in cases involving mistaken eyewitness identifications, and as
such, their perceptions are vital to our understanding of this important issue. Kebbel and
Milne (1998) conducted a survey assessing police perceptions of eyewitnesses in the
United Kingdom. Officers reported that eyewitnesses typically provide them with their
primary leads in a case. Additionally, officers responded that eyewitnesses are rarely
inaccurate in their identifications and believe that an eyewitness’ identification
confidence, typically gauged by the witness’ response time, indicates their accuracy.
Detectives also reported using eyewitness evidence to provide them with or to confirm
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suspects when conducting criminal investigations. This research shows us that a positive
identification of a suspect by an eyewitness is sometimes used as the only piece of
evidence against a criminal defendant at trial. As a result, in an attempt to combat the
powerful influences of eyewitness testimony at trial, the defense may call an eyewitness
evidence expert to testify about the reliability of eyewitness identifications (Leippe,
1995). Thus, it is vital that eyewitness identification evidence is collected by law
enforcement in a precise manner.
Researchers report that experts do not always agree on the utility of eyewitness
confidence as a predictor of eyewitness accuracy (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon,
2001). In this study, 47 of 64 eyewitness experts surveyed, indicated that they would be
willing to testify on the poor predictive ability of confidence with respect to accuracy.
Further, 51 indicated they would testify that confidence is influenced by variables other
than accuracy (e.g., confirming feedback provided by police after a positive
identification). The gap that exists between expert opinions and the intuitive beliefs of
law enforcement regarding eyewitness confidence and accuracy, reinforces the
importance of this area for researchers examining eyewitness identification (Schmechel,
O'Toole, Easterly, & Loftus, 2006).
The relation between eyewitness confidence and eyewitness accuracy has been
widely researched (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). Results of numerous studies
have led eyewitness researchers to agree that the confidence-accuracy relationship is
weakly correlated (Deffenbacher, 1980; Leippe, 1980). Despite the empirical findings
converging on this weak relation, law enforcement remain heavily reliant on eyewitness
confidence to gauge the accuracy of any particular identification.
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The importance of research in eyewitness identification extends to specific types
of lineups and the procedures associated with them. In particular, researchers examining
the relation between eyewitnesses who select from a line-up (choosers) vs. those who do
not (non-choosers), report a weak correlation between eyewitness confidence and
identification accuracy (Sporer et al., 1995). Although Sporer and colleagues advocate for
separating choosers from non-choosers in empirical studies, non-choosers play a limited
role in the legal system. In other words in a real world setting, it is rare for an individual
to view a lineup and not provide a subsequent identification. However, in spite of the
restricted empirical significance of this research, judicial decision-makers carefully
consider its relevance in legal decisions pertaining to eyewitnesses (Clark, Howell, &
Davey, 2008).
Critics of eyewitness research argue that many laboratory studies examining the
role of memory in forming identifications have limited ecological validity (Egeth, 1993;
Konecni & Ebbesen, 1986; Yuille, 1993). In response to this criticism, Behrman and
Richards (2005) compared archival results with experimental results in a unique twoexperiment study. In the first study, they examined 183 police cases with eyewitness
identifications involving 424 photo arrays and 37 live line-up situations. Line-up records
were analyzed for statements of confidence, non-hesitant choosers and witnesses who
used a process of elimination. They found that the best predictor of a suspect
identification (as opposed to a line-up filler) was quick responding. In addition, verbal
confidence – statements of positivity and/or sureness - was found to be a strong predictor
of suspect identification. In fact, only 2.5% of choosers selected a foil with a high degree
of confidence. However, researchers have expressed caution when interpreting these data.

7

I Can Explain

Specifically, the limited control of extraneous variables in archival data, biased line-ups,
and the possibility that the suspect was not present in the line-up, are all factors that
should be taken into account when considering ecological validity.
In a second study, Behrman and Richards evaluated these factors through
observation (response time) and a post-identification questionnaire. The results closely
mirrored their archival study, finding a stronger relationship between confidence and
potential accuracy in field settings. Namely, if eyewitness confidence and identification
accuracy are related for choosers, then collecting eyewitness post-identification
confidence in an accurate and consistent manner is critical. These procedures have been
recognized by many federal and state law enforcement agencies that now obtain a
confidence rating immediately following an identification (Technical Working Group for
Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). These results have promising implications considering the
heavy reliance of law enforcement on eyewitness confidence (Kebbel & Milne, 1998).
Although the research on confidence and accuracy is mixed, it is important to
understand the implications of a positive identification for law enforcement. In a recent
meta-analysis, Clark, Howell and Davey (2008), uncovered five patterns of identification
responses and their implications. They reviewed 94 experiments to determine the
diagnostic value of different eyewitness’ responses after viewing a line-up. The
categories of these responses included: suspect identification in both target-absent and
target-present line-ups, foil identification, “I don’t know” statements, or statements of
rejection of the line-up. Howell and Davey concluded that suspect identifications in nonbiased line-ups were diagnostic of a suspect’s guilt. A non-biased lineup is defined as one
that is properly instructed and fillers are chosen based on witness description. These
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results indicate that under appropriate conditions, an eyewitness identification is
potentially indicative of a suspect’s guilt in a court of law. However, the utility of this
evidence disappears with improper selection of fillers or biased line-up instructions.
Thus, biased line-up procedures may not only affect the diagnosticity of the identification
but the eyewitness’ post-identification confidence as well.
When a lineup is presented to an eyewitness, the resulting influence on
identification accuracy has been found to be problematic (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson,
2002; Luus & Wells, 1994). Although base rates and initial encoding are important, it is
important to test whether certain techniques can improve an eyewitness’ memory.
Perfect, et al. (2008) conducted five experiments on the effect of an eyewitness closing
their eyes while recalling the details of a witnessed event. The researchers believed that
closing one’s eyes aids individuals in remembering details. They developed this belief
from previous research on the cognitive interview, an interviewing technique designed to
aid investigators when questioning a witness (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland,
1985). During live or videotaped witnessing conditions, participants were asked to recall
various details of the viewed crime (i.e., how many people were in the room), through
either cued or free recall. The effect of eye-closing was dramatic, with significant
increases in the amount and accuracy of details recalled. This effect was shown for freerecall and cued recall and both visual and auditory information. Further, the results were
replicated with several sets of stimulus materials, i.e., videotaped events, live events,
pertinent information and incidental information. These results show promise of the
development of techniques used to increase eyewitness recall. Increasing the accuracy or
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number of details that an eyewitness recalls is likely to lead to an increase in the
confidence in their identification.
Eyewitness identification can also be influenced by social factors; namely
conformity – a well-established concept in social psychology literature (Luus & Wells,
1994). Studies of conformity reveal that the social pressures evident with a desire to “fit
in”, result in conforming to group norms. This result is often revealed despite the
presence of alternative and obvious information (Asch, 1951; Beloff, 1958; Walker &
Andrade, 1996). In his seminal work, Solomon Asch revealed that in a group setting,
when faced with a choice between the need to be right and the need to be liked,
individuals chose the latter even when obvious information contradicted the group.
Stanley Milgram (1963) established a similar result when examining individuals’
obedience to authority, another factor that may play a role in eyewitness identifications.
In Milgram’s classic obedience study, the experimenter insisted that individuals provide
shocks up to 450 volts to individuals posing as confederates who responded incorrectly
on a word pair task. A similar dynamic exists in the social situation of eyewitness
identification. Namely, the eyewitness is put in a social situation with potential pressures
to conform and obey an authority figure, i.e., police officer. Researchers have found that
in an attempt to obey the authority figure, pressure to choose a suspect increases, in turn,
increasing the number of false identifications (Malpass & Devine, 1981; Steblay, Hosch,
Culhane, & McWethy, 2006). An officer, or co-witness has the potential to reinforce
confidence in erroneous identifications by providing the eyewitness with confirming
feedback; e.g., That’s who we thought it was. The resulting effects are drastic and
provide evidence of the role of social influence on changes in confidence statements, as
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well as the identification itself (Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004; Wells & Bradfield,
1999).
Confirming feedback is a type of social influence present during lineup
procedures capable of affecting eyewitness identification (Semmler, Brewer, & Wells,
2004). Confirming feedback is typically offered to an eyewitness following an
identification. Semmler, Brewer, and Wells (2004) had participants watch a videotaped
robbery, and then identify a suspect through a computerized photo array. After making
an identification, some participants were told by the experimenter that another witness
had identified the same suspect as them. After the feedback or a filler task, participants
were asked to provide a retrospective estimate of confidence at the time of the ID as well
as a current estimate of confidence. Results showed that confirming feedback caused
confidence to become inflated for all participants in the feedback condition, regardless of
accuracy or presence of actual suspect. In another study, designed to investigate the
effects of police feedback on eyewitness memory, Bradfield, Wells and Olson (2002) had
participants view a video of a simulated crime and make a subsequent identification in a
six-person videotaped lineup. They found that participants given post-identification
feedback by the lineup administrator in the form of: “Good you identified the actual
suspect”, reported increased confidence, better viewing conditions, and increased
attention to the crimes. Further, their results indicated that confidence inflation was
moderated by the accuracy of the witness, showing greater confidence inflation for
inaccurate witnesses. Similar, research has shown that confirming feedback after an
identification distorted other aspects of eyewitness recollections as well, such as reporting
a better view, paying more attention, remembering more details, and identifying the
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suspect with ease (Wells & Bradfield, 1999; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003). Thus,
confirming feedback following an identification is particularly troublesome because it not
only has a robust effect on confidence estimates but may influence eyewitness’
perceptions of other forensically relevant variables as well.
Confidence malleability, or the probability of an eyewitness to change his/her
confidence, occurs not only with confirming feedback but with disconfirming feedback as
well. Luus and Wells (1994) conducted a staged theft study in which pairs of participants
witnessed a live event. The witnesses were then separated before making an
identification. In the initial identification, witnesses chose the member of the lineup they
believed was the perpetrator. After the identification, participants were given feedback
regarding the other witness’ identification. The feedback consisted of whether or not
additional witnesses chose the same suspect. The campus police then videotaped these
witnesses while making a second identification that included an estimate of confidence.
Results showed that witnesses in the confirming feedback condition had higher
identification confidence ratings than controls. In contrast, witnesses in the
disconfirming feedback condition had lower identification confidence ratings compared
to participants in the no feedback condition. In a second study (Luus & Wells, 1994), the
videotaped identifications were then shown to another group of participants who rated
each witness with respect to accuracy, believability, etc. Participants rated the more
confident witnesses as more accurate and believed these eyewitnesses had a better view,
were more persuasive, and gave better descriptions, despite not having access to this
additional information. This finding implies that confidence, despite extraneous
influences, has a notable influence on an observer. In a legal sense, observer can be
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defined as presiding judge and/or jury. In a separate study, Wells and colleagues (2003)
were unable replicate the disconfirming feedback effect showing that although
disconfirming feedback has the potential to decrease confidence, it is not clear which
variables control this effect. One could argue that increasing or decreasing a witness’
confidence does not change the results of an identification, and is therefore of minimal
importance, but if a lineup is conducted fairly, namely without biasing feedback,
confidence will not be improperly inflated. These studies have important implications for
police practices and can be implemented relatively easily due to law enforcement’s
control of both lineup administration and control (Wells, 1978). The fact the eyewitness
confidence is malleable may be minimally concerning if an eyewitness is able to correct
for external influences.
Brewer, Keast, and Rishworth (2002) examined the effects of eyewitness
reflection and post-identification disconfirmation reflection on the confidence-accuracy
relation. Eyewitness reflection is defined as reflecting on or thinking about the
identification/witnessing conditions; post-identification disconfirmation reflection
involves thinking about why, as an eyewitness, you may be incorrect in your evaluation
of identification/witnessing conditions. In the eyewitness reflection condition,
participants completed a survey that instructed them to think about various witnessing
conditions, i.e. “How much attention did you pay to the persons face?” The
disconfirmation reflection survey included questions designed to have participants
question their choice, i.e., “List as many reasons as you can as to why the person you
picked may not actually be the thief.” Participants completed the survey with questions
aimed at disconfirming or reflecting on their identification, after the identification and
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then provided a confidence estimate between 0-100%. The confidence-accuracy
relationship for both experimental groups (those who either reflected or were provided
with disconfirming reflection) had stronger confidence-accuracy correlations than
participants in the control group (no feedback). Participants in the reflection and
disconfirmation conditions had more accurate identifications for higher levels of
confidence. Thus, witnesses who are instructed to actively reflect upon their
identification may provide more precise confidence estimates. Kassin (1985) reported a
similar finding with eyewitnesses who watched a videotape of themselves identifying the
suspect before giving a confidence estimate. One explanation for the self-reflection
phenomenon may be that it stimulates a memory-based process that influences an
eyewitness’ confidence-accuracy relationship. These findings indicated that eyewitness
confidence is easily influenced and may be improved through self-reflection (Perfect, et.
al., 2008). Further, if the confidence-accuracy relationship for any given witness is
increased, then his/her testimony may be more likely to reflect the actual guilt of a
suspect. Comparing varying estimates of confidence inflation has become an important
area of eyewitness research (Charman & Wells, 2008).
One question researchers have tested is whether informing the eyewitness of
potential confidence inflators would enable them to self-correct their confidence prior to
trial? Charman and Wells (2008) examined an eyewitness’ ability to estimate the impact
of confirming feedback or cautionary instructions on their confidence, following an
identification. Interestingly, they found that those who received confirming feedback
were able to accurately estimate the influence of that feedback. However, participants
who did not receive confirming feedback overestimated the influence that any confirming
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feedback would have had on their confidence. The implications of this finding could be
quite considerable if eyewitness identifications are videotaped to document evidence.
Jurors, who are shown the eyewitness identification video at trial, may overestimate the
influences they perceive to have changed a witness’ confidence level; e.g., the suspect
stood out in the lineup and that is why he/she chose him so confidently. Charman and
Wells concluded that witnesses are able to correctly identify influencing variables, but do
not always accurately estimate the amount of influence. If factors influencing the
eyewitness’ identification confidence are submitted as evidence in a trial, it has important
implications for forming a jury’s perception of eyewitness credibility.
In response to the numerous erroneous convictions due to mistaken
identifications, a Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence released a report in
1999 that established guidelines for law enforcement officials regarding the ideal way to
gather eyewitness evidence. One of the recommendations was to obtain a confidence
statement immediately following the witnesses’ identification. Although the courts and
law enforcement often rely on confidence estimates, research reviewed above has shown
that eyewitness confidence is fraught with complications, many in the form of
malleability, sensitivity to instructions, etc.. Despite the numerous pitfalls, eyewitness
confidence remains a significant factor that prosecutors, judges and jurors use as an index
of witness credibility (Schmechel et al., 2006).
In Neil v. Biggers (1972), the United States Supreme Court ruled that there should
be five criteria governing the credibility of eyewitness testimony. These factors were
developed by the court to assist the trier of fact in weighing eyewitness evidence. The
five factors included were viewing conditions of the suspect during the crime, including
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time viewed, lighting etc., attentiveness of the witness during the crime, the accuracy of
the witness’ initial description of the suspect, the confidence of the witness at
identification and the elapsed time between identification and the crime. If the witness is
deemed credible by these criteria, then his/her testimony would be admissible.
In order to test how potential jurors integrate the five Biggers criteria to estimate
witness accuracy, Bradfield and Wells (2000) examined Kaplan’s (1982) summative
hypothesis. The summative hypothesis assumes that each of the five criteria would be
weighed individually by jurors and then added separately in the jurors’ conclusions about
the eyewitness. Thus, an eyewitness with a good view who was confident would be
perceived as more accurate than a confident witness without a good view. Participants
read a trial transcript in which an eyewitness provided testimony regarding their
confidence in their identification, their viewing conditions and their attentiveness during
the crime. In response to the prosecutor’s query about the identification, eyewitness
confidence was manipulated in the transcript from “I’m positive” to “I’m not really sure.”
The results demonstrated support for the summative hypothesis showing main effects for
each manipulated criteria. Confidence, attention, viewing conditions, accuracy of the
witness’ initial description, and the elapsed time between identification and the crime
each had a significant effect on the participants’ ratings of witness accuracy and witness
believability (Bradfield & Wells, 2000). If jurors do in fact, sum the information
presented to them, then changes in confidence would have an independent effect from
explanations and no interaction would be detected. If jurors are summing these criteria
without an understanding of the potential pitfalls of eyewitness evidence, then erroneous

16

I Can Explain

convictions are more likely to occur. The average person and potential juror’s knowledge
regarding eyewitness evidence is vital in translating this body of research.
The potential juror’s knowledge of eyewitness evidence is similar to that of law
enforcement’s knowledge previously reviewed. Noon and Hollin (1987) conducted a
survey evaluating law students’ knowledge of eyewitness evidence. Half of the
participants agreed that an eyewitness was able to accurately identify a face after one year
and one exposure. The remaining participants (51%) correctly recognized that after 2
weeks, memory for the once seen face drops off to a negligible level. Additionally, 79%
of participants reported that confidence was a moderate to strong predictor of accuracy
despite difficult viewing conditions. The idea that confident witnesses are accurate
appears to be well documented and is found among lawyers, judges, law enforcement and
potential jurors (Schmechel, et al., 2006). Arguably, potential jurors should possess
similar beliefs to the participants surveyed above. This has important implications if the
eyewitness has been provided with additional information from police or a co-witness.
When or if this is the case, eyewitness confidence is likely to change by the time they
testify at trial. The impending result is the jury’s unawareness of the artificial inflation of
confidence by feedback or other variables. The eyewitness, having been coached by the
prosecutor, would appear confident at trial, and the jury would likely perceive this
confidence as an indication of accuracy, potentially leading to an increase in erroneous
convictions.
Berman, Narby, and Cutler (1995) studied inconsistent testimony – a potentially
influential variable on perceptions of an eyewitness. They found that participant-jurors
were more likely to believe and render a guilty verdict for witnesses who provide
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consistent testimony. Brewer and Burke (2002) manipulated eyewitness testimony and
the appearance of confidence in an audiotaped trial experiment. These researchers found
that inconsistent confident eyewitnesses were rated as more believable than a consistent
witness who did not appear confident. One limitation to this research however, is the
operational definition of confidence used in this study. Specifically, the researchers
manipulated confidence by having less confident witnesses appear hesitant. This may not
be consistent with actual eyewitnesses due to opportunities to rehearsed testimony prior
to trial and therefore provide an inflated confidence estimate at trial.
Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson (1979) examined the influence of an eyewitness’
self-rated confidence at trial on jurors’ perceptions of the eyewitness. The eyewitnesses
viewed a staged crime, made an identification, rated their confidence on a 9-point scale
and then testified live in front of participant jurors. Jurors rated confident eyewitnesses as
being highly accurate regardless of actual accuracy. In this study, both inaccurate and
accurate witnesses testified. Cutler, Penrod, and Stuve (1988), manipulated ten legally
relevant witnessing conditions and found eyewitness confidence to be the only significant
predictor of verdict. Fifty-four percent of the participant-jurors convicted the defendant
after viewing an eyewitness who stated he was 100% confident. In contrast, conviction
rate dropped to 39% when the eyewitness stated he was 80% confident. Although
identification accuracy has no noticeable effect on jurors’ perceptions of witness
credibility, witness’ identification confidence has been found to increase perceived
credibility by researchers examining the effect of identification accuracy (Lindsay, Wells,
& O'Connor, 1989). With similar results, a drastic increase in confidence – from unsure
at lineup to positive at trial – was studied simultaneously with the effect of cross-
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examination on juror perceptions (Bradfield & McQuiston, 2004). This research indicated
that the evidence of extreme confidence inflation increased defense-favorable attitudes;
i.e., more not guilty verdicts. An important caveat however, is the unlikelihood that a
witness will testify if they are unsure at the time of identification.
Jones, Williams and Brewer (2008) conducted a study to determine if obtaining a
post-identification confidence estimate would mediate the deleterious effects of
confidence inflation of eyewitnesses. In the first study, they provided trial transcripts to
participant-jurors depicting an eyewitness whose confidence inflated from 60% to 99%
confident. After providing an in-court estimate of 99% confidence during direct
examination, it was revealed during cross-examination that the witness was only 60%
confident post-identification. This inflation was either challenged questioning, “Why are
you more confident now?” or merely stating by the defense attorney during crossexamination. They found that participant-jurors rated inflated witnesses as less credible,
less accurate and more inconsistent. However, despite statistical significance,
participants’ scaled scores narrowly fluctuated. After analyzing responses to two openended items regarding how participant-jurors interpreted the eyewitness inconsistency,
the researchers concluded three distinct eyewitness attributions: (a) prosecutorial strategy,
(b) memory contamination and (c) confidence epiphany. The confidence epiphany group
rated the eyewitness as more credible and accurate than jurors in the other two groups. In
fact, their estimates mirrored the control group’s credibility estimates.
In the second study, the researchers varied the eyewitness’ response to an inquiry
about her confidence inflation to determine if causal explanations for the confidence
change effected jurors’ perceptions. Responses were varied as strategy based – “I want
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people to believe me, I want someone to be held accountable for what happened to me”;
memory contamination – “Well, I have been rehearsing my testimony and have become
more confident with each rehearsal”; or confidence epiphany – “I was nervous at the
identification but now I am confident and have recalled more details”. Consistent with the
findings from the first study, participant-jurors rated the eyewitness as less credible and
accurate if they attributed the inflation to a strategy or memory contamination. If an
eyewitness were to have a confidence epiphany prior to trial, then jurors believed the
witness and were more likely to convict the defendant. Although it is still unclear exactly
how jurors weigh eyewitness evidence, this body of research lends itself to some tentative
conclusions. First, a confidence epiphany by an eyewitness, or remembering more details
and becoming more confident on his/her own, is likely to be perceived as more credible
than a confidence inflation due to rehearsing or strategy. Second, jurors perceive
consistent testimony as more believable and accurate.
Research in the field of eyewitness evidence provides ideas about ways in which
jurors may interpret eyewitness evidence. Specifically, the summative hypothesis
assumes that jurors will sum the information provided to them at trial regarding
eyewitness credibility (Kaplan, 1982). In addition, confirming feedback has been shown
to inflate an eyewitness’ confidence estimate following an identification (Bradfield et al.,
2002; Luus & Wells, 1994; Semmler et al., 2004). This inflated confidence estimate
when presented during trial may influence perceptions of the eyewitness and subsequent
identification as well. Potential jurors may perceive confidence inflation due to a
memory-based process as an inconsistency in an eyewitness’ statement. Jurors perceive
eyewitnesses who provided inconsistent statements as less accurate (Berman & Cutler,
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1996; Berman et al., 1995). It would follow then that people may perceive eyewitnesses
whose confidence inflates due to social factors as more accurate. This is in direct
opposition to research findings that demonstrate confidence inflation due to confirming
feedback does not reflect accuracy (Bradfield, et al., 2002; Wells & Bradfield, 1999).
Research on eyewitness confidence has presented it as an unstable characteristic
(Luus & Wells, 1994; Semmler, et al., 2004; Wells, et al., 2003). Namely, the relation
between confirming feedback and confidence estimates have the potential to affect
eyewitness’ beliefs regarding other legally relevant variables (Bradfield, et al., 2002;
Luus & Wells, 1994; Wells, et al., 1979). Although disconfirming feedback has the
potential to decrease confidence, it is not clear which variables control this effect.
Drastic eyewitness confidence changes have been shown to be perceived negatively by
participant-jurors (Bradfield & McQuiston, 2004; Bradfield & Wells, 2000). It is not
clear, however, how minor changes in eyewitness confidence would interact with an
explanation for this change and subsequently influence jurors’ perceptions. In order for
an eyewitness to testify at trial, his or her confidence estimate would have to be quite
high; i.e., 80% or above. When an eyewitness presents a confidence rating that has been
artificially inflated, it remains unknown to the jury. This is problematic because if jurors
are relying on confidence to assess the eyewitness’ accuracy, then the confidence rating
provided by the eyewitness at trial is misleading.
One safeguard designed to protect defendants from presenting inflated confidence
estimates to jurors is written into the best practices lineup recommendations currently
used in New Jersey and North Carolina. These recommendations require the eyewitness
to provide in their own words, their confidence immediately following the identification.
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If inconsistencies regarding a witness’ confidence are highlighted during crossexamination, it benefits researchers to assess the impact of this inconsistency and how
varying explanations by the eyewitness concerning the discrepancies in confidence
estimates. Confidence estimates may be influenced by numerous variables, which may
increase or decrease witness’ confidence. For example, confirming or disconfirming
feedback has the potential to influence an eyewitness’ confidence rating (Luus & Wells,
1994; Wells & Bradfield, 1999). The confidence change could also be the result of a
memory-based process of self-reflection, which has been shown to increase the
confidence-accuracy relationship (Brewer, et al., 2002). Although at trial a witness may
explain his/her changes in confidence, the impact of the explanation needs further
examination. This study will attempt to isolate two factors that may potentially increase
or decrease confidence estimates: memory and social influences (Bradfield, et al., 2002;
Brewer, et al., 2002; Semmler, et al., 2004). Utilizing videotaped confidence
identifications, participants viewed an eyewitness provide an explanation for their slight
confidence increase. To our knowledge, this is the first study assessing the impact of
social versus memory-based explanations for eyewitness confidence changes on their
perceived credibility. In addition, this research will advance an understanding of how a
confidence increase by an eyewitness is perceived.
The present study is a one-way between subjects design examining perceptions of
three explanations (Memory-based vs. Socially-Influenced vs. None) following an
increase in a witness’ confidence. Participants were exposed to 1 of 5 conditions: Social
Explanation, Memory-Based Explanation, No Explanation, High-No Rating, and No
Rating-Low Confidence. Increasing confidence in our explanation conditions was defined
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as 80% post-identification to 100% follow-up confidence. In addition, two other control
conditions were examined, an 80% post-identification confidence only condition, defined
as No Rating-Low; and a 100% follow-up confidence only condition, defined as High-No
Rating. Perceptions of the eyewitness will change as a function of explanation, with a
memory-based explanation predicted to be perceived as the most credible, accurate,
consistent, etc., followed by No Explanation and a socially-influenced explanation
respectively. Mere confidence inflation (No Explanation condition) will be perceived as
less credible, accurate, consistent, etc than control conditions with no inflation (High-No
Rating and No Rating-Low). In addition, perceptions of the eyewitness, perceived
fairness of the identification and relation to law enforcement will predict the perceived
overall accuracy of the identification.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology, political science and
history courses from a Northeast Liberal Arts University. They received extra credit for
their participation. Participants were 126 (63 males, 63 females) students ranging in age
from 18-44 years old. The participants were 88% European American participants, 2.4%
Hispanic participants, 2.4% Asian participants and 7.1% other ethnicity participants.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five experimental conditions.
Materials
Videotape. A summary was created describing an armed robbery of a convenience
store, involving one eyewitness (the store clerk). A five-minute videotaped presentation
was developed using an actor and a police detective. A 25-year-old female graduate
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student portrayed the eyewitness. A detective from a Northeast law enforcement agency
portrayed the detective in the video. The detective took the eyewitness through a typical
eyewitness identification procedure involving a photo array lineup displayed sequentially,
in which the eyewitness identifies a suspect. After the identification, the eyewitness
provided a confidence rating of 80% or no confidence rating. In the next scene, which
was identified in subtitles as two weeks later, the eyewitness returns to the police station
for a second interview. The detective welcomes the eyewitness back and reviews her
earlier identification interview. The detective asks typical questions about the crime,
which remains constant over each manipulation. In the Low Initial confidence condition,
the detective does not query about the eyewitness’ confidence in interview two. In the
other four conditions, the detective asks how confident the eyewitness is today about her
identification during questioning. In the High Latter Confidence condition, the
eyewitness provides a confidence rating of 100% in interview two in contrast to no
confidence rating in interview one. In the Social-Influence, Memorial-Based and No
explanation conditions, the eyewitness provides a confidence rating of 100% that
represents an increase from interview one. A follow-up question was then presented by
the detective (Why did your confidence change?), for which the eyewitness gave a
Socially Influenced explanation, a Memory-Based explanation, or none at all (in this
condition the follow up question was not be asked). In the Socially-Influenced
Explanation condition participants see the eyewitness respond to the detectives query
“Why did your confidence change?” in the second interview, by stating “Well after I
picked the guy out, you guys (the police) gave me the feeling that I picked out the right
person.” In the Memory-Based Explanation condition participants view the eyewitness
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justify the confidence change by stating “I thought about it when I got home. I
remembered exactly what her nose looked like, and I knew that was the girl I picked out.”
In the No Explanation Condition participants saw the eyewitness change his/her
confidence but were not exposed to any follow-up questions.
Post-Videotape Instrument. After viewing the videotape, participants were asked
about their perceptions of the eyewitness. A seven-point Likert-type scale was used to
assess the participants’ perceptions, from 0 (not at all accurate/consistent/trustworthy,
etc.) to 6 (very accurate/consistent/trustworthy, etc.). Several questions addressed the
confidence changes of the eyewitness and served as manipulation checks. Participants
then completed several demographic questions. See Appendix A for the informed
consent, Appendix B for the questionnaire, and Appendix C for HSRB approval.
Procedure
After obtaining informed consent, participants read a summary describing the
crime. After reading the summary, participants watched one of five video presentations
depicting two interviews between the police detective and the eyewitness. The first
interview consisted of a detective presenting the eyewitness with a photo array lineup.
Immediately following the first interview, participants were shown the second interview,
identified as occurring two weeks later by subtitles, depicting the eyewitness giving an
increase in their confidence, a 100% confidence rating or no confidence rating to the
detective. A social explanation, a memory-based explanation, or no explanation followed
this confidence rating. After viewing one of the five video presentations participants
completed the questionnaire. The questionnaire contained questions regarding their
perceptions of the eyewitness, the identification and finally demographic information.
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Perceptions of the eyewitness addressed were confidence levels, credibility,
trustworthiness and reliability. Participants were thanked for their participation and
debriefed as to their nature of our study.
Results
Manipulation Check
In order to assess participants’ awareness of our manipulations, a 3 X 3
crosstabulation was conducted on our experimental conditions. Of the 77 participants in
the Confidence Inflation conditions, 73 (95%) correctly identified the first eyewitness
confidence rating as 80%, 74 correctly identified the second eyewitness confidence rating
of 100%. In addition, 22 of 26 (85%) correctly identified the 80% confidence rating in
the Low-No Rating condition, and 16 of 23 (70%) correctly identified the 100%
confidence rating in the No Rating-High condition. Of 125 participants, 104 (83%)
correctly identified that two weeks had passed between the consecutive interviews.
Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis I. A one-way analysis of variance was performed to investigate the
type of eyewitness explanation offered on perceptions of the eyewitness. The seven
dependent variables analyzed included: credibility, honesty, consistency, accuracy,
confusion, likeability and trustworthiness. Items were scored on a 7-point Likert-type
scale from 0 = Not at all credible/honest, etc. to 6 = Very credible/honest etc. The three
levels of explanation included: Social, Memory-Based, or None. There were no
significant effects of type of explanation offered on any of the dependent variables.
Collapsed Conditions. Due to the lack of significant effects of our explanation
manipulation, data were collapsed across the three explanation conditions. Remaining
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analyses were conducted on three levels of the independent variable, Confidence Inflation
(Inflation, Low No-Rating, and No Rating-High conditions).
Hypothesis II. Hypotheses II was examined with respect to perceptions of the
eyewitness as a function of confidence ratings. A one-way analysis of variance was
conducted on the seven items addressing perceptions of the eyewitness. A significant
effect was found for four of the seven items. For credibility: F (2, 123) = 3.84, p = .024;
ηp2 = .06, for consistency: F (2, 123) = 26.74, p < .001; ηp2 = .30, for accuracy: F (2,
123) = 6.88, p = .001; ηp2 = .10, for confusion: F (2, 123) = 6.42, p = .002; ηp2 = .09. See
Table 1 for Mean Differences.
Hypothesis III. Hypothesis III was examined to determine the predictive ability
of perceptions of the eyewitness on the accuracy of the identification. Other predictor
variables included: perceptions of fairness of the identifications, and self-reported
association with law enforcement. Perceptions of the eyewitness scale, consisting of 7
items, possessed good internal consistency, with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .87.
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of these factors on the
likelihood that participants would rate the eyewitness identification as accurate. The
model contained three independent variables (Perceptions of the eyewitness scaled score
dichotomized into High and Low, perceptions of the fairness of the identification, and
relation to law enforcement). The full model containing all predictors was statistically
significant, χ2 (3, N = 126) = 30.7, p < .001, indicating that the model was able to
distinguish between participants who perceived the identification as accurate and
inaccurate. The model as a whole explained between 21.8% (Cox and Snell R square)
and 30.3% (Nagelkerke R-squared) of the variance in perceived accuracy, and correctly
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classified 68.8% of cases. As shown in Table 2, only one of the independent variables
made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. The strongest predictor
of rating the eyewitness identification as accurate was the Perceptions of the Eyewitness
scaled score, recording an odds ratio of 8.61. This indicated that participants who rated
the eyewitness positively were over 8 times more likely to rate the eyewitness
identification as accurate than participants who rated the eyewitness negatively,
controlling for all other factors in the model.
Discussion
Eyewitness evidence has been an increasingly popular topic in legal psychology
over the last 30 years. Law enforcement often relies heavily on eyewitness
identifications, the strength of which is typically judged by the eyewitness’ self-rated
confidence. Despite questionable validity, the criminal justice system uses this evidence
at trial as long as it meets criteria outlined by the U.S. Supreme court in Neil v. Biggers
(1972). Confidence estimates can be gathered prior to the identification, at the time of
identification, at a follow-up interview and at trial. Evidence has shown that confidence is
quite malleable, and can be affected by several factors. Feedback, whether confirming,
disconfirming, delayed or immediate can increase or decrease confidence. In addition,
research has shown that confidence has an effect on jurors’ perceptions of eyewitness
credibility and witnessing conditions (Bradfield & McQuiston, 2004; Bradfield & Wells,
2000; Berman, et al., 1995). This research sought to begin to understand the effect that a
change in confidence followed by an explanation would have on jurors’ perceptions of
eyewitness credibility.
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Inconsistent with our hypotheses perceptions of the eyewitness did not change
according to type of explanation given. There were no significant differences found
among the three experimental conditions. This is inconsistent with the research of Jones,
et al. (2008), who reported significant differences on perceived accuracy and credibility
for a confidence inflation from 60% to 99% accompanied by a Confidence Epiphany, a
Memory Contamination, or a Strategy based explanation. It is possible that we did not
find effects due to the smaller magnitude of our confidence inflation, however this was
important for ecological validity. Witnesses presenting inconsistent confidence
statements (the confidence inflation conditions) were perceived as less accurate, less
consistent, less credible and more confused than participants in the No Rating-High
condition, which only provided a single confidence statement. This is in line with
previous research demonstrating that inconsistent testimony is perceived as less accurate,
etc. (Berman, et al., 1995). If law enforcement is collecting post-identification
confidence, this could prove useful to the defense when confidence inflates at trial. It
appears that any explanation for this inconsistency does little to nullify the
inconsistency’s effect on perceptions of the eyewitness. However, these results will need
to be replicated before any broad conclusions can be made. Interestingly, participants
perceptions in the Low-No Rating condition did not significantly differ from those in the
Inflation condition (the inconsistent conditions), except for perceptions of consistency.
An eyewitness’ confidence rating of 80% was seen just as accurate and credible as that of
an inflated, inconsistent rating of 80% to 100%. If this result were replicated, this would
mean that a witness whose confidence is inflated by coaching will not be discredited by a
previous confidence statement that was presented provided that it was 80% or above.
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Whether these results will replicate to verbal judgments of confidence, I’m pretty sure to
I’m positive, remains to be seen and is an area of potential future investigation.
Consistent with the findings of Jones, et al. (2008), the logistic regression
revealed that Perceptions of the eyewitness dichotomized scaled score significantly
predicted the perceived overall accuracy of the witness’ identification. Jones and
colleagues found that participants in the Confidence Epiphany condition who rated the
eyewitness as more accurate and credible were also more likely to convict. This implies
that it is the perceptions of the eyewitness that is driving their credibility, perceived
accuracy of their identification and ultimately their likelihood to convict based on this
evidence. In fact, Perceptions of the eyewitness scale was the only significant contributor
to our model. Although, perceived fairness of the identification did not contribute to the
model this may be due to ceiling effects. If unfair identification procedures are utilized in
future research, this may emerge as a significant predictor of perceived identification
accuracy as well.
During manipulation checks, we discovered that participants in the control
conditions did not accurately identify the eyewitness’ confidence. When no confidence
rating was given, the vast majority of participants reported a confidence rating despite the
not applicable option. This finding may be because jurors are assigning confidence
ratings to the witness even when none is given. If this hypothesis is correct, then
obtaining post-identification confidence becomes an important piece of evidence. This
finding warrants further study, as future research could evaluate if and/or when jurors are
assigning confidence estimates to eyewitnesses. In addition, future research should
examine the confidence inconsistency effect using trial simulation methods and examine
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whether the effect of confidence changes are moderated by other possible explanations.
Although this research provides some evidence, replicating these results with other
eyewitnesses (i.e., a male) will provide validation. In our sample of participants,
European Americans were overrepresented when compared to the population of potential
jurors. Lastly, although confidence was isolated during consecutive interviews for the
purposes of this study, this design has limited ecological validity. This limitation is
easily rectified by utilizing trial simulation methods in future research.

31

I Can Explain

References
Behrman, B. W., & Richards, R. E. (2005). Suspect/foil identification in actual crimes
and in the laboratory: A reality monitoring analysis. Law and Human Behavior,
29, 279-301.
Beloff, H. (1958, January). Two forms of social conformity: Acquiescence and
conventionality. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 56(1), 99-104.
Berman, G. L., & Cutler, B. L. (1996). Effects of inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony
on mock-juror decision-making. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81, 170-177.
Berman, G. L., Narby, D. J., & Cutler, B. L. (1995). Effects of inconsistent eyewitness
statements on mock-jurors' evaluations of the eyewitness, perceptions of
defendant culpability and verdicts. Law and Human Behavior, 19, 79-88.
Bradfield, A., & McQuiston, D. E. (2004). When does evidence of eyewitness confidence
inflation affect judgments in a criminal trial? Law and Human Behavior, 28, 369387.
Bradfield, A. L., & Wells, G. L. (2000). The perceived validity of eyewitness
identification testimony: A test of the five Biggers criteria. Law and Human
Behavior, 24, 581-594.
Bradfield, A. L., Wells, G. L., & Olson, E. A. (2002). The damaging effect of confirming
feedback on the relation between eyewitness certainty and identification accuracy.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 112-120.
Brewer, N., & Burke, A. (2002). Effects of testimonial inconsistencies and eyewitness
confidence on mock-juror judgments. Law and Human Behavior, 26, 353-364.

32

I Can Explain

Brewer, N., Keast, A., & Rishworth, A. (2002). The confidence-accuracy relationship in
eyewitness identification: The effects of reflection and disconfirmation on
correlation and calibration. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8, 4456.
Charman, S., & Wells, G. (2008, March). Can eyewitnesses correct for external
influences on their lineup identifications? The actual/counterfactual assessment
paradigm. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 14(1), 5-20.
Clark, S., Howell, R., & Davey, S. (2008, June). Regularities in eyewitness identification.
Law and Human Behavior, 32(3), 187-218.
Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Stuve, T. E. (1988). Juror decision making in eyewitness
identification cases. Law and Human Behavior, 12, 41-56.
Deffenbacher, K. A. (1980). Eyewitness accuracy and confidence: Can we inferanything
about their relationship? Law and Human Behavior, 4, 243-260.
Egeth, H. E. (1993, May). What do we not know about eyewitness identification?
American Psychologist, 48, 577-580.
Geiselman, R. E., Fisher, R. P., MacKinnon, D. P., & Holland, H. L. (1985). Eyewitness
memory enhancement in the police interview: Cognitive retrieval mnemonics
versus hypnosis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70, 401-412.
Jones, E., Williams, K., & Brewer, N. (2008, April). 'I had a confidence epiphany!':
Obstacles to combating post-identification confidence inflation. Law and Human
Behavior, 32(2), 164-176.

33

I Can Explain

Kaplan, M. F. (1982). Cognitive processes in the individual juror. In N.L. Kerr & R.M
Bray (Eds.), The psychology of the courtroom (pp. 197-220). London: Academic
Press.
Kassin, S. M. (1985). Eyewitness identification: retrospective self-awareness and the
accuracy-confidence correlation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
49, 878-893.
Kassin, S. M., Tubb, V. A., Hosch, H. M., & Memon, A. (2001). On the "general
acceptance" of eyewitness testimony research. American Psychologist, 56, 405416.
Kebbel, M. R., & Milne, R. (1998). Police officers' perceptions of eyewitness
performance in forensic investigations. The Journal of Social Psychology, 138,
323-330.
Konecni, V., & Ebbesen, E. (1986, June). Courtroom testimony by psychologists on
eyewitness identification issues: Critical notes and reflections. Law and Human
Behavior, 10(1), 117-126.
Leippe, M. R. (1980). Effects of integrative memorial and cognitive processes on the
correspondence of eyewitness accuracy and confidence. Law and Human
Behavior, 4, 261-274.
Leippe, M. R. (1995, December). The case for expert testimony about eyewitness
memory. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 1(4), 909-959.
Leippe, M. R., Wells, G. L., & Ostrom, T. M. (1978). Crime seriousness as a determinant
of accuracy in eyewitness identification. Journal of Applied Psychology, 63, 345351.

34

I Can Explain

Lindsay, R. C. L., Wells, G. L., & O'Connor, F. J. (1989). Mock-juror belief of accurate
and inaccurate eyewitnesses. Law and Human Behavior, 13, 333-339.
Luus, C. A. E., & Wells, G. L. (1994). The malleability of eyewitness confidence: Cowitness and perseverance effects. Journal of Applied Psychology, 79, 714-723.
Malpass, R., & Devine, P. (1981, August). Eyewitness identification: Lineup instructions
and the absence of the offender. Journal of Applied Psychology, 66(4), 482-489.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375 (1972).
Noon, E., & Hollin, C. R. (1987). Lay knowledge of eyewitness behavior: A British
survey. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 1, 143-153.
Perfect, T., Wagstaff, G., Moore, D., Andrews, B., Cleveland, V., Newcombe, S., et al.
(2008, August). How can we help witnesses to remember more? It's an (eyes)
open and shut case. Law and Human Behavior, 32(4), 314-324.
Schmechel, R. S., O'Toole, T. P., Easterly, C., & Loftus, E. F. (2006). Beyond the Ken?
Testing Jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence. Jurimetrics,
46, 177-214.
Semmler, C., Brewer, N., & Wells, G. L. (2004). Effects of post-identification feedback
on eyewitness identification and non-identification confidence. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 89, 334-346.
Sporer, L. S., Penrod, S., Read, D., & Cutler, B. (1995). Choosing, confidence, and
accuracy: A meta-analysis of the confidence-accuracy relation in eyewitness
identification studies. Psychological Bulletin, 118, 315-327.

35

I Can Explain

Steblay, N., Hosch, H., Culhane, S., & McWethy, A. (2006, August). The Impact on
Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A
Meta-Analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 30(4), 469-492.
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence. (1999). Eyewitness evidence: A
guide for law enforcement. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
Walker, M., & Andrade, M. (1996, June). Conformity in the Asch task as a function of
age. Journal of Social Psychology, 136(3), 367-372.
Wells, G. (1978, December). Applied eyewitness-testimony research: System variables
and estimator variables. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(12),
1546-1557.
Wells, G. L., & Bradfield, A. L. (1999). Distortions in eyewitness recollections: Can the
post-identification-feedback effect be moderated? Psychological Science, 10, 138144.
Wells, G. L., Lindsay, R. C. L., & Ferguson, T. J. (1979). Accuracy, confidence, and
juror perceptions in eyewitness identification. Journal of Applied Psychology, 64,
440-448.
Wells, G. L., Olson, E. A., & Charman, S. D. (2003). Distorted retrospective eyewitness
reports as functions of feedback and delay. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Applied, 9, 42-52.
Yuille, J. C. (1993, May). We must study forensic eyewitnesses to know about them.
American Psychologist, 48, 572-573.

36

I Can Explain

Table 1. Mean Ratings of the Eyewitness
Condition
Inflation

High-No Rating

No Rating-Low

_______________________________________________________________
Eyewitness Perceptions
Accuracy

3.35a

4.30b

3.81ab

Confusion

3.16a

2.00b

2.5ab

Consistency

2.74a

4.83b

4.00c

Credibility

3.57a

4.35b

3.73ab

______________________________________________________________

Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly at p < .05.
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Predicting Perceived Accuracy of Witness Identification
B

S.E.

Wald

df

Odds Ratio

Perceptions of the Eyewitness1

2.15

.47

21.38

1

8.61

Perceived Fairness of Identification

-.21

.17

1.58

1

.21

Relation to Law Enforcement

-.33

.44

.57

1

.72

________________________________________________________________________
Note. 1 Responses dichotomized as High/Low: significant predictor at p < .001.
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Appendix A
Informed Consent

I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in this research project entitled
“Mock Juror Perceptions of Eyewitness Confidence Malleability and Differential
Explanations” I understand that I will be one of 240 individuals participating in this
project. My participation is expected to last approximately 30 minutes.
I understand that the purpose of this research is to enhance the knowledge of
eyewitness testimony. Participants will read and complete the survey anonymously after
viewing a short video presentation.
I understand that there are no known risks involved in my participation. I
understand by attending today I will receive extra credit in my core class. I have been
told that my responses will be strictly anonymous; my records will be coded with a
number and my name will not appear on any of the forms.
I understand that I may withdraw my consent and discontinue participation in this
research project at any time with no negative consequences. I have been given the right
to ask questions concerning the procedure, and any questions have been answered to my
satisfaction.
If I desire further information about this research project I may contact Dr. Garret
Berman at (401) 254-3341 or Dr. Don Whitworth at (401) 254-3509. I have been
offered a copy of this informed consent. I have read and understand the above.

_______________________________

Date______________________

Participant’s Name (Print Name)

_______________________________
Participant’s signature

Date______________________
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Appendix B

Please be sure to answer every question on this
questionnaire by filling in the circle that corresponds to the
appropriate response.
Please take a few minutes to fill out this survey, you will be asked to fill out demographic
information and questions regarding the videotape that was just viewed. Thank you for
your time.
Questions about the videotape:
1. How credible did you find Mindy to be?














0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all
Credible

Very
Credible

2. How honest did you find Mindy to be?














0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all
Honest

Very Honest

3. How consistent did you find Mindy to be?














0

1

2

3

4

5

6
Very
Consistent

Not at all
Consistent
4. How accurate did you find Mindy to be?












0

1

2

3

4

5

Not at all
Accurate


6
Very
Accurate
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5. How confused did you find Mindy to be?














0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all
Confused

Very
Confused

6. How likeable did you find Mindy to be?














0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all
Likeable

Very Likeable

7. How trustworthy did you find Mindy to be?














0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all
Trustworthy

Very
Trustworthy

8. The identification procedures employed by the detective were fair:














0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
agree

9. How would you evaluate the eyewitness identification in this case: (choose
one)




Accurate

Inaccurate

10. How important was Mindy’s confidence from the first interview in evaluating
the accuracy of her identification?














0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not Very

Very

Important

Important
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11. How important was Mindy’s confidence from the second interview in evaluating
the accuracy of her identification?














0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not Very

Very

Important

Important

12. How confident was Mindy during the identification procedure?












20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Unknown

13. How confident was Mindy during the follow-up interview with the detective?












20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Unknown

14. How much time had passed between the first and follow-up interviews?










1 day

1 week

2 weeks

1 month

1

year

15. Circle the percentage that you believe best reflects Mindy’s identification
accuracy:










20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

16. If this case goes to trial, rate the likelihood that you would convict the
defendant based upon the eyewitnesses memory














0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not Very

Very

Likely

Likely
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Demographic Information
17. Your gender




Male

Female

18. Into which of these age categories do you fall:










17-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64


65 & Older

19. Which of the following best characterizes your background:










White, NonHispanic

Hispanic

Black, NonHispanic

Asian

Other

20. Your Marital Status:












Single

Married

Re-married

Separated

Divorced and
Single

Widowed

21. Your current political preference: (not necessarily your registration)








Democrat

Republican

Independent

Other

22. Aside from your political affiliation, how would you evaluate your political
views:








Liberal

Slightly Liberal

Slightly
Conservative

Conservative

23. Do you have a valid Driver’s License:




No

Yes
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24. Have you ever served on a jury in a civil case:




No

Yes

25. What is your occupation:












Not working/
unemployed

Student

Employed parttime

Employed fulltime

Retired

Other

26. Are you either a close friend of, or related to, any law enforcement officer:
(including retired police officers)




No

Yes

27. What is the highest level of education you have attained:












Grade school

Some high
school

High school
diploma

Some college
junior college

College degree

Post-graduate
college degree
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Appendix C
Mock Juror Perceptions of Eyewitness Confidence Malleability and Differential
Explanations
Principal Investigator: Melissa Paiva, BA
Supervisor:

Garret Berman, PhD.

Co-investigator:

Ryan Weipert

Graduate Student, Forensic Psychology
CAS, Psychology Department
Graduate Student, Forensic Psychology

1. Project Description: The goal of this research study is to examine how jurors might
perceive an eyewitness to a crime that has identified a suspect. If the eyewitness
confidence level changes prior to trial, it is not clear how jurors will interpret that
information. This study will present participants with a video presentation of an
eyewitness identifying a suspect and then changing their confidence about their
identification in a subsequent interview. The eyewitness will give either a plausible
reason for changing their confidence or a reason that was unfairly influenced by
information obtained after the identification. Each participant will see an eyewitness
either increasing or decreasing their confidence and either giving a plausible or tainted
reason. The participants will then be asked to complete a questionnaire assessing the
credibility of the eyewitness.

2. Participants: Participants will be recruited from undergraduate core classes at Roger
Williams University.

3. Research Procedures and Methodology: Participants will be given informed consent
to review before participating in the study. Participants will watch the video presentation
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(See Appendix A for a transcript) and complete a questionnaire (See Appendix B) in a
vacant classroom. Questionnaires will be collected by researchers for analysis. Analysis
will be conducted utilizing ANOVA in SPSS. Participants will be debriefed regarding
the purposes of the study. The researchers do not anticipate any negative affects of
participation. Participants will be offered extra credit in their corresponding core class
for their time.

4. Consent Procedures: Informed consent will include a standardized consent form (See
Appendix C) in accordance with APA guidelines. Participants will be given informed
consent prior to participation.

5. Data Confidentiality: Participants will be asked to complete demographic information
on their questionnaires. Their questionnaires will be numbered in order to ensure
anonymity.

6. Risks/Discomforts to the Participants: The researchers do not anticipate any risks or
discomforts to the participants. Participants will be debriefed as to the purposes of the
study.

7. Benefits of the Study: The benefit of this study will be to promote the understanding
of how changes in confidence are perceived by potential jurors.
Signatures:
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__________________________
Principal Investigator
__________________________
Co-Investigator

__________________________
Supervisor
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